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Abstract. Nation states are no longer the only sovereigns; their role in law-making has been
accompanied by non-governmental subjects. We claim that these actors are generally
organizations of organizations. This poses several fundamental theoretical questions about the
nature of these private entities and the interplay of the legal system, political domain, private
interest - and the citizen. We limit our investigation to the shift in law-making towards self-
created laws by, and for, organizations of organizations. They are unlike other organizations in
their drive to change not just their cognitive and normative environments, but also their
regulative environment, which in turn regulates the activities of other actors.
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Introduction
Traditionally nation states have been seen as the only sovereign subjects entitled to pass laws
and delegate this power if necessary. Parliaments as political organizations have been the
production plants of law and regulation both at the national and international levels. In short:
they have been the main source of new legislation. Other actors, e. g. multinational enterprises
and international organizations, have only had an insignificant and, more importantly, an
intermediary role, as participants to be heard, not to legislate themselves. Their repertoire
included lobbying, informing, diplomatic and coercive measures and bribery, but
constitutional acts were reserved for nation states.
However, the source of new global law is no longer nation-states and institutionalized politics.
Instead the dominant sources of global law are now to be found at the peripheries of law;
actors that have not traditionally been recognized as subjects of international law, have
become in some sense constitutional subjects. These actors are international organizations,
multinational enterprises, international trade unions, interest groups and non-governmental
organizations as participants in global decision-making (Teubner, 2004a).  The connective
feature between these actors is that they all consist from number of organizations. They are
organizations of organizations.
Literature has established the role of organizations and other such systems in creating law in
the international realm (Robé, 1997; Muchlinski, 1997). Globalization creates a notable
amount of new requirements for regulation and norms in the international sphere, that national
governments or governmental actors are unable, and in some cases unwilling, to fulfil. This
has launched a development trend of increasing private regulation passed and enforced by the
non-public regimes themselves (Teubner, 2004b). We claim that generally these organizations
and systems are not independent actors of some industry or organizational field, but instead
they are more constitutive by nature, as they are consortiums of groups of organizations. In
other words, we argue for a new starting point for examining organizations of organizations as
active players in the field on law. Research on them should re-orientate as the traditional
perspective towards organizations risks neglecting some pivotal characteristics of the research
subject.
We define these “meta-organizations” (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2005) as follows: they do not
consist of individual people, are global or at least international (for example in the European
Union context), articulate the interests of their field and gain their position by claiming to
represent larger body of interests or an organizational field. They are however not the sum of
their organizational parts but often enjoy a certain autonomy – and even drive towards
contested outcomes for their members. In this paper, we are interested in organizations of
organizations that are capable of producing their own laws, although we recognize that in
some cases this is difficult to determine. By producing their laws we mean that they can create
norms in their own limited domain. Furthermore, they have the capability to enforce these
norms and use coercive measures if necessary. Hence, organizations of organizations become
legal orders as they fulfil the requirements set by Weber (2004); capability to legislate and
enforce the norms.
In fact, we speculate that the main purpose of these entities is to create favourable legal
environment and norms that benefit the industry in question. One recent example process,
which has a number of worrying characteristics, is the round of negotiations related to the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) treaty. The treaty is a new effort to build a
plurilateral legal agreement that countries could join and an autonomous governing body
outside such actors as UN (United Nations), WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization)
or WTO (World Trade Organization). The treaty is meant to complement the TRIPS
agreement and focus especially on digital goods.
The entire agreement was negotiated in secrecy; all the material related to the negotiations
was originally classified and citizens only gained information through leaks. Even members
of the national parliaments were required to agree to non-disclosure agreements, a very
foreign practice to many parliaments in Europe. At the same time, several lobbyists had
access to the drafts through NDA agreements they had made with the USTR (United States
Trade Representative), because they were offering their “suggestions to improve the
agreement” to the process. These companies include for example Google, Dell, Sony Pictures
and interest groups such as International Intellectual Property Alliance (includes the Business
Software Alliance), Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), and Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.
When ready, the agreement will be binding to all countries that join as members and the
governing body will have the means to coerce compliance.
This case illustrates the functions organizations of organizations may serve in the sphere of
international law and regulation. The example also offers an interesting contrast to the roles of
governments and their citizens in these negotiations. The trajectory of their roles is declining
while the importance of organizations of organizations is growing. In what follows we
describe this transition theoretically.
The emergence of new international law
The idea of the modern nation state was based on the Westphalian notion of sovereignty.
International law was bilateral and appeared between states, not above them. Otherwise the
traditional Westphalian structure of international relations would break down. The sovereignty
of the state presupposed that there was no law, even international, above it, as the sovereignty
of the states would otherwise be restricted. Based on this idea of the sovereignty of the state
within certain territorial limits the constitutional subjects, e. g. monarchy and republic,
inherited the monopoly of decision-making and violence. Authority to give resolutions in
disputes between commercial partners was centred to courts controlled by the law of the
nation state. However, in some cases, especially in disputes where the context was not
restricted to national law, there emerged lex mercatoria, a merchant law based on the
principles of Roman law that regulated bilateral trade.
The structure of international relations has been going through a transformation in the past
decades. The development of communication and transport technologies has increased the
possibilities for interlinkages between nation states and created new global opportunities.
Companies found themselves in a global marketplace and identified new needs for legal
cooperation in areas such as standard setting, banking systems etc.
This transition has three distinct characteristics:
1) The sheer number of actors has grown exponentially
2) Private entities have grown and entered in force to the making of international
law
3) Non-political settling of disputes happens outside courts
The limits of private interest and the public sphere (of sovereignty) have blurred as private
actors have gained foothold in international law. Former peripheries of law have become
dominant sources of global legislation. In addition to official courts, disputes are brought to
new bodies such as ethics committees and treaty systems.
The formal part of this cooperation actualized as organizations of organizations. Entities
planned to represent and serve the interest of their members by taking part in international
decision-making. Individual organizations transfer some of the accountability for their actions
to these upper-level actors. It is important that no individual organization (or its decision-
makers) is responsible for the actions. Thus organizations of organizations have more freedom
to pursue the interest of the organizational field as agreed by the member organizations. If
they drive an unpopular agenda, they, rather than the individual organizations, serve as a
public face. These organizations of organizations can also specialize; they build capacity,
collect industrial knowledge, organize research efforts, and build personal relations to be more
effective in driving the interest of the field. But it should be noted that they also serve as the
medium which articulates the (sometimes conflicting) interests of their member organizations.
To summarize, these are new kinds of organizations of organizations that differ materially
from the previous actors.
Theoretically, industrialization and global markets created needs and conditions for new
actors. Private enterprises established formal and non-formal cooperation with each other in
order to increase their role in their field. At the same time, they have become subjects of the
changing field of international law. These methods seem to be successful for the organizations
as we can observe from the ACTA negotiations.
But what about the Westphalian notion of sovereignty? We claim that this recent development
questions the sovereignty of states as the only origin of law. The consequences of this are
discussed in the following.
Self-regulation of private interest outside the public sphere
The needs of the global markets and the tendency of rationalization create new arenas of law-
making. In addition to traditional institutions, regulation and norms are also created by semi-
public, quasi-private or private actors. This current organizational development has a myriad
consequences mainly for, but not limited to the legal sphere. We claim that the global law
legislated by organizations of organizations has significant effects on the transparency and
accountability of legal order.
Organizations of organizations are unlike other forms of organizations, because they are able
to change, not just their environment, but legal framework, constitution, which also regulates
the activities of all other organizations.  Institutionalism (Scott, 1995) analyses organizational
environment by using three pillars of institutions which exert influence on individual
organizations: regulative, normative and cognitive.  Often recent research has started from the
focus on institutional environments “characterized by the elaboration or rules and
requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to gain support or
legitimacy” (Scott, 1995, 132).  In contrast, we define organizations of organizations from a
very different view since their main purpose is to change the institutional environment’s
conditions of the regulative pillar for their benefit. We move from exerting regulative
influence on the individual organizations into a situation where these organizations are de jure
privately self-regulated (within certain limits).
Often institutional theory starts on constrains posed by the environment: for example, nuclear
disaster in Fukushima, caused by the tsunami, created a strong pressure in EU for increased
security evaluation in power plants. European Commission pushes for new regulation, but the
exact details will be in European level discussion during summer 2011. Majority of the
participants in the negotiations are organizations of organizations (such as EU and IAEA).
Many assume that cognitive and normative pillars of institutional theory would be ‘softer’,
that is easier to change from organizations perspective, whereas the legal environment would
be mainly given. However, we argue for a more balanced approach, by taking seriously the
opportunities of untraditional actors to shape the legal sphere. Control over the content of the
regulative pillar is spreading more widely and legislator’s monopoly is failing. This approach
complements institutional theory by providing additional variety to the binary opposition
between legal and non-legal. Instead of focusing on the given norms, we focus on the debate
over the norms.
This changing of the regulative environment begs the question of the mandate for the
changes. When even national legislation processes often suffer from problems of guaranteeing
representation related to the wants of the citizens, the process is even more problematic for
representation when organizations represent (in some way) other organizations. Furthermore
these organizations consist of actors driven by private interest and “limited liability”. Under
normal western democracies one citizen has one vote, which is used to select parliamentary
representatives, who also have each one vote when making new laws. In other words, the
procedural justice is aimed to guarantee the equality of citizens and it is based on the equality
of subjects.  In contrast, organizations of organizations set their own processes for
representation, which are not based on similar equality, but their stake in the joint venture.
Often the large incumbent companies have means to dominate the decisions. To summarize:
the derived norms are suspect.
Taking into consideration the very limited number of parties involved in an organization of
organizations, one could presuppose that the decision-making must be easier, more
transparent and democratic, than in the context of a nation state. Second, members of the
organization must have common and homogeneous interest as they have established the
organization to secure and promote those goals. That is ultimately the pivotal reason why they
have joined the umbrella organization.  However, their interests are not identical, but similar.
By this we refer to the fact that different actors of one industry or branch have certain
common goals, but they also differ in objectives regarding for example market segments,
industry position, customer differentiation and leadership.
In addition, and more importantly, the structure of organizations of organizations is far from
neutral and is not a consequence of any real deliberative process in the Habermasian (2001)
sense. The structure reflects the industry structure where larger incumbent organizations have
more say and occupy the most prestigious positions. In fact the opposite orientations of
organizations are more essential than the common ones, but the latter ones are the driving
force for formal cooperation. Mediation between organizations having different market
segments, industry positions etc. is the fundamental aspect, which eventually shapes the
nature of the organization of organization.
Furthermore, the actual negotiation processes are obscured to mask the internal divisions that
could weaken the organizations of organizations. This has the side effect of increased secrecy,
which in turn may dampen the necessary critiques and may remove due diligence from the
leadership. Secrecy is evident also when they negotiate with each other.  The needs for
maximized secrecy and democratic deliberation remain in obvious tension – as the ACTA
negotiations show.
The main downside is loss of accountability and the biased incentives concerning the
organization which create the law. The constitutional acts and norms are enacted by the
objects of the said legislation, which have quite clear incentives to spin them to their benefit.
The democratic ideal of the empowered citizen participating in a deliberative process
concerning the law is utterly sidestepped in the process.
Conclusions and discussion
The findings confirm that the focal point of international lawmaking is transferring. New
constitutional roles of organizations of organizations undermine the sovereignty of nation
states and the traditional Westphalian system, as they are gaining more control over private
regulation. This development lacks the deliberative elements expected of constitutive acts and
leaves citizens in a bystander role. The interest-based structure of organizations of
organizations guarantees that the norms created serve the objectives of their members rather
than the common good. To balance the increased corporate power, citizens have built their
own parallel organizations (NGOs such as Electronic Frontier Foundation and international
environmental groups) to negotiate as equals.
It is crucial to understand the changes in the regulative environment and how organizations of
organizations shape them and therefore research on them is very topical. Our contribution in
this paper remains mainly theoretical. Thus we call for more multi-disciplinary and empirical
research on the organizing of organizations and especially their interplay with the changing
international legal system. One interesting avenue of research would be the consequences of
the convergence of law and management.
Institutional theory provides us the lenses to examine the different pillars. We stress the
importance of organizations of organizations in transforming the regulative pillar instead of
taking it as a given. Organizations are capable of pursuing their goals by changing, not only
the cognitive and normative pillars, but also the regulative environment.
We observe a clear trend towards private actors shaping the legal sphere. The most vital
outcome of this transition is the cancerous spread of norms and constitutional acts that
undermine the rule of law and turn the public legal processes to serve a private interest. Enter
the new sovereigns: organizations of organizations.
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